JAOPLIMC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 19 CR 651 (LTS) V. 5 NIKOLAOS LIMBERATOS, 6 Defendant. 7 ----x 8 New York, N.Y. October 24, 2019 9 11:20 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 GEOFFREY S. BERMAN, United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 ROBERT B. SOBELMAN SAMUEL P. ROTHSCHILD DANIEL LOSS 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 KARLOFF C. COMMISSIONG 20 Attorney for Defendant 21 ALSO PRESENT: PRETRIAL SERVICES OFFICER JOSH ROTHMAN 22 TASK FORCE OFFICER JOHN HOFFMAN TASK FORCE OFFICER JOHN REUTHER 23 24 25

(In open court)

THE COURT: Good morning again. Would everyone other than counsel please be seated.

(Case called)

THE COURT: Since we're starting a new transcript, counsel, your appearances again.

MR. SOBELMAN: Robert Sobelman, Samuel Rothschild and Daniel Loss for the United States, and we're joined at counsel table by Task Force Officers John Hoffman and John Reuther of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. And from the Pretrial Services Office, we have Officer Joshua Rothman here.

MR. ROTHMAN: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Rothman.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Karloff Commissiong on behalf of Mr. Limberatos, who is standing next to me, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, gentlemen. Please be seated.

So this is the government's appeal of the bail determination made by Judge Wang in October. I don't have the precise date in front of me. I received the government's letter appealing that bail decision. I have reviewed it. I have also reviewed Mr. Commissiong's memorandum in opposition, and I've reviewed the transcript of the proceeding before Judge Wang and the pretrial services report —

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1 MR. COMMISSIONG: Pardon me. 2 THE COURT: -- concerning -- yes? 3 MR. COMMISSIONG: Pardon the interruption. I just wanted to make one small correction. I stated in the letter 4 5 that he has an 11-year-old daughter and a 15-year-old daughter. 6 He has a 15-year-old daughter and a 17-year-old daughter. 7 15-year-old daughter, who I referenced with respect to the medical records, that's correct. The 17-year-old daughter is 8 9 the daughter with whom he scouts colleges with. 10 THE COURT: I was thinking that the 15-year-old was --11 MR. COMMISSIONG: A bit young. 12 THE COURT: -- both energetic and precocious. 13 Thank you, your Honor. MR. COMMISSIONG: 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you for straightening 15 that out. I went to college when I was 16; so it's not impossible, but although, not necessarily typical. So thank 16 you for that correction. 17 18 So I have an obligation to make a determination de novo, but I have read the record of the proceeding 19 20 beforehand; so I am not unfamiliar with the arguments and the 21 evidentiary proffers upon which those arguments rest. 22 I understand that it is the government's position that 23 it is risk of flight that warrants detention here. That burden 24 is a preponderance of the evidence. The government is not

making a danger to the community argument.

So I'm going to ask the government to start off and ask that, in the government's remarks, you focus me on any evidence that you have showing Mr. Limberatos, himself, as opposed to participants in the conspiracy generally, as having access to significant funds and/or fraudulent travel documents that point to a likelihood of flight, notwithstanding conditions and the combination of conditions that have been put in place.

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. If I may, your Honor's obviously familiar with the record. I won't repeat the arguments we made either in our submission or at the bail hearing. I'd like to take a moment, before I turn to your Honor's question, to just respond to some of the things that were in Mr. Commissiong's letter --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SOBELMAN: -- that was filed yesterday.

First, your Honor, one of the grounds that he relies on for stating that he would not leave the country is -- I'm sorry, your Honor. One of the things he talks about is that, well, even if he goes to Greece, the government could extradite him. That rests on a false premise. Greece, as a general rule, does not extradite their own citizens.

Just yesterday Judge Cote, in a fraud case, ordered that a defendant be detained pending trial on risk of flight grounds. The case is *United States v. Telemaque Lavidas*.

That's T-e-l-e-m-a-q-u-e, L-a-v-i-d-a-s. It's 19 CR 716. That gentleman is actually an American citizen but has Greek parentage. His parents were from Greece, and one of the factors that Judge Cote rested her decision on was that because he could flee to Greece, then obtain Greek citizenship, due to his parentage, and therefore, not be extraditable to the United States was one of the principal factors she relied upon that is a risk of flight.

Here, we are not dealing with an American citizen. We are dealing with a Greek citizen.

THE COURT: Before we go away from the Lavidas case as precedent, is that a person who had family, children, job, property here in the United States and other strong ties to the area?

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor. He worked here. He had a job. He had — I believe he had either one or two children. He wasn't facing a mandatory minimum, which I'll note. He did have some extensive travel, but I believe he did have children. It's not my case. I'm not familiar with all the facts, but I did —

THE COURT: The facts are important.

MR. SOBELMAN: No, I understand, your Honor. I'm just familiar -- I raise it not that it's the same case, or they're even necessarily the same in every way, but I raise it just to make the point about the Greek citizenship issue and the

extradition point that defense counsel raised is false. It is baseless.

He cannot be extradited from Greece. They have a general rule regarding extradition. So if he can successfully get there, he is done, he is free, and that is a huge problem both for defense counsel's argument and for the government, should he leave the United States.

Another point that defense counsel raises in the submission is that he wouldn't leave his daughters. First of all, his daughters could relocate to Greece more easily than he could spring himself from jail, should he be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment, which we expect to occur in this case.

People leave their children for these same reasons not infrequently. Just last week, a defendant named Rosa Rodriguez, in case 19 CR 729 was granted bail in large part because she had a seven-year-old son that she had to care for and claimed that she had no one else that would be able to take care of him. Within a few days, she dropped the kid off with someone else, at family or friend, and is believed now to be in the Dominican Republic, where she was a citizen. She did not appear for her arraignment in front of Judge Aaron.

Again, different type of case. It's not on all fours here. I'm not saying they are the same defendant, but it is not inconceivable that Mr. Limberatos would rationally decide

he would rather live out his life in Greece, than spend what is, at least at this point, a mandatory two years, should he be convicted, in federal prison before inevitably being deported due to being convicted of an aggravated felony. It's not inconceivable that someone would leave their children. Again, a woman did it just last week.

Mr. Commissiong relies heavily on the *Paulino* case.

Obviously, Paulino is a District Court case. It's not binding, just as Judge Cote's decision on the case yesterday is not binding. But Paulino is distinguishable on many grounds, some of which are even in the block quote that defense counsel used in his letter.

For example, Paulino is an American citizen, not a citizen of a foreign country that doesn't extradite their own citizens to the United States. He had no known travel history, aside from travel as a young child, unlike this defendant, who has a fairly extensive travel history. And Paulino, unlike this defendant, was truly indigent.

The government, obviously, hasn't been privy to this defendant's financial disclosure. We were a little surprised that he was found eligible for appointed counsel. We're not going to challenge that, that's in the discretion of the Court, but he disclosed in his pretrial services report that he has at least \$50,000 in cash, and this goes to your Honor's question -- not in cash, I'm sorry, in a bank account, in a

checking account. And this goes to your Honor's question about the means to flee.

Going to the Greek consulate or embassy and getting a new passport and buying a plane ticket to Greece would hardly cost \$50,000. And again, your Honor, as we stated in the prior proceeding, we don't have evidence that this defendant specifically had in his possession false identity documents, but that's the nature of the scheme.

At one point in defense counsel's letter, he says there's no allegations of identity theft or impersonation. He's charged with aggravated identity theft. Yes, he did not, as far as we know, actually hold a passport in another name with his picture on it, at this point, but he likely had no reason to. He was able to reside here lawfully and travel freely. He no longer can do that.

Now he has the incentive to use his network to obtain those documents that we know, because we've intercepted them and had cooperating sources tell us about them and their availability to other members of the same organization. Of note, in the search warrant that was executed at

Mr. Limberatos' home, and I note the photos we offered both at the bail hearing and some then additional ones from the search warrant during — in our letter are just a few of literally over 500 photographs that were taken of evidence in his home.

This is just a few from ones that law enforcement had the

chance to look through and analyze.

The amount of evidence gathered from his home was overwhelming and voluminous. There was a package in his home that was shipped to another address, not his home address, that bore the name that is listed in the indictment as his alias. It was shipped to not his name, but his alias.

This is someone who is using a false name recently as part of committing this crime, and again, is charged with aggravated identity theft. It is not a leap to think that he would have access to be able to procure or be able to manufacture a false identity document that would assist him in traveling.

Finally, your Honor, another -- I think it's just an error in defense counsel's submission. On page 4, they state that two percent of non-citizens who are placed on electronic monitoring became fugitives and cites the bail hearing. If your Honor looks at the transcript, which I'm sure your Honor did, on page 21, that is not the statistic that's offered. It's not of non-citizens. It's two percent of the defendants who are placed on electronic monitoring. There is no mention of whether they are citizens or non-citizens.

Many non-citizens are detained pending trial in a variety of types of cases where they're charged with aggravated felonies for precisely the reasons that we're stating here. I don't have in front of me what the percentage of people placed

on electronic monitoring are, in terms of their citizenship, but it would not be a leap to infer that many of them probably are citizens, like Paulino, because many non-citizens are detained pending trial, like the defendant.

In addition, and I think I noted this at the bail hearing before the Magistrate Judge, the government's position is that the court, the magistrate judges and the district judges in this district generally get it right with respect to detention. Sometimes they don't, in our view, but they generally do, and that's why the rate of people fleeing is fairly low. It's not because people don't want to flee. It's that the people like Mr. Limberatos, who have the means, the incentive, the ability and a place to go, are detained.

Two more points -- I'm sorry, one more point in response and then, your Honor, I have to answer any of your questions, which is -- and defense counsel made this argument at the prior bail hearing as well. Well, we don't really know what's in these pictures, and that's just false. The government knows what's in the pictures from his house. We know what we seized. It looks like other evidence that's been seized and viewed in the course of this investigation.

We have law enforcement witnesses who will and can testify about what those items are. They are items that are used either potentially for use or, for many of them, exclusively for ATM skimming. They are advanced technology.

They are sophisticated technology, and there is no other purpose to have some of those things than to participate in the crime that's charged.

The fact that one cannot look at a circuit board or a deep-insert ATM skimmer and know, as a layperson or as a defense attorney, oh, that's a deep-insert ATM skimmer, instead of a firearm, in the example that I think defense counsel gave or drugs, is of no moment. We know what those are.

Mr. Limberatos knows what those are.

Defense counsel hasn't suggested that any of the items are not what they appear to be, or what the government says they are, and certainly the burden is not on him, but we think the government should credit -- I'm sorry, we think the Court should credit the government's proffer of what we seized and what those items are.

Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any other questions the Court may have. Otherwise, we'll rest on our papers.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SOBELMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Commissiong?

MR. COMMISSIONG: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Morning.

MR. COMMISSIONG: I think that my first point, your Honor, is he's here. He's right here, sitting before your Honor in this courtroom, and although the government said that

your Honor should give no weight to the fact that he will attend this court conference, she has, and he was actually early, your Honor. Your Honor should put full weight on the fact that he's here, the fact that he is attending this court conference, the fact that he is fulfilling the very responsibilities that the government said that he would not.

Your Honor, the government stated that, as a rule, Greece will not extradite Greek nationals. Well, that's a bit inaccurate. Greece won't extradite Greek nationals unless there's a bilateral agreement, and I believe I cited to a bilateral agreement that the State Department has on their website. United States and Greece, they have a bilateral agreement regarding extradition. So any issue — if, if, if that were to come up, there is an extradition agreement between the United States and Greece.

Your Honor, the government mentioned that his daughters could easily relocate. Your Honor, how many hypotheticals are the government going to come up with in order to have Mr. Limberatos detained? They can come up with as many hypotheticals as they want. Your Honor, they are just hypothetical. They're not backed up by any facts. They're not backed up by any statistics. They're not backed up by any studies whatsoever, and I think that this is a good segue for me to get into a stat that the government believes I misquoted.

That stat was a stat that I got from pretrial

services. I called Francesca Miller from pretrial services and asked specifically about the statistic that she provided to the Court on October 10th during the bail hearing before Judge Wang, and she -- and I could be wrong. I will leave myself open to that, but the statistic was, based on the question that Judge Wang asked, was with respect to the percentage of non-citizen defendants that become fugitives, and that number is less than two percent.

Your Honor, the government, in their motion and here today, cited cases, cited recent cases where individuals fled, and I addressed those cases in my motion. There have been studies, actual studies done with actual hard statistics saying people in drug cases are 78 percent more likely to flee than people specifically in theft and fraud cases. The government referenced the case of Rosa Rodriguez, where Ms. Rodriguez fled just last week. That's another narcotics case that falls squarely within the statistics provided by the administrative office of the courts.

With respect to the case before Judge Cote, I think that that just goes back to the fact that there's a bilateral agreement regarding extradition between the United States and Greece, and the government wasn't able to come up with any more facts regarding property, regarding family, and children.

While we know that Mr. Limberatos is a property owner here in the United States. He runs a business here in the

United States. He has two daughters, and he lives with his daughters, along with their mother, Ms. Flora Perrotta, here in the United States. They go to school here in the United States. They have a life here in the United States.

I referenced one of his daughters and some medical issues she has. That's important. That's something that the government just hasn't considered, hasn't taken into account, but that, along with all the other things that we've mentioned, those represent significant ties to the community, significant ties that will keep Mr. Limberatos here in the United States, keep him coming back to court, keep him fulfilling his responsibilities because in fulfilling his responsibilities to your Honor and to this court and to this system, he's fulfilling his responsibilities to his family, your Honor.

The government made an issue in their motion and here this morning with respect to him having — it's not a leap, I think they said, it's not a leap for someone who participated in a case like this to then obtain or create a false passport. I think it's a bit of a leap, your Honor. I think it's a bit of a leap, I think, when they haven't charged him, they haven't indicated that he's used a false identity to acquire something or to go somewhere or to travel. They haven't indicated anything like that. This is another one of the government's hypotheticals that they're coming up with. It's a stretch, your Honor, to convince your Honor that Mr. Limberatos should

be detained.

With respect to the materials found in his home, your Honor, law enforcement may have taken a look at those materials. Defense counsel hasn't. We've seen pictures. We haven't seen what the actual materials are, and I won't call them evidence here in the courtroom, your Honor. As far as I know, those are just materials. The government can call it evidence, if they like, but those are materials that were found in his garage. We don't know what their use is. We don't know what they are. We don't know whether we'll need expert testimony to say what these electronic parts are, these electronic pieces, what machines, if any, these things are. And unless law enforcement are now going to say that they're some sort of engineers, I don't see how law enforcement can say what these things are either.

Other than that, we'll rest on our motion, unless your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: Not at this time. Thank you. Before I let the government reply, if it wishes to, Mr. Rothman, do you have any knowledge of the statistics regarding flight by non-citizens who are released on monitoring?

MR. ROTHMAN: I don't have any specific statistics in front of me to quote from this morning, but as the lead specialist for location monitoring in the office, I do know that our fugitive rate is fairly low.

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1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 MR. ROTHMAN: You're welcome. 3 THE COURT: And that's overall fugitive rate, citizens 4 and non-citizens? 5 MR. ROTHMAN: Correct. That are placed on location 6 monitoring. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sobelman, this bilateral agreement. 8 9 MR. SOBELMAN: Very briefly, your Honor. I have not 10 reviewed the bilateral agreement, but I did review -- my 11 understanding is that Judge Cote yesterday found exactly what I 12 expressed to your Honor, which is that even someone who is not 13 a Greek citizen could go to Greece, become a citizen and would 14 not be subject to extradition pursuant to the arrangement. 15 The bilateral treaty doesn't mean that they will extradite anyone that we want them to. We have bilateral 16 17 treaties with I think over a hundred nations and many of them have restrictions, including not being able to extradite 18 citizens of that country to the United States. It might only 19 20 apply to others, but the point is this, Greece still has --21 THE COURT: Do you know whether the bilateral treaty 22 was even argued in front of Judge Cote, or whether she examined 23 that? 24 MR. SOBELMAN: I don't, your Honor. I would need

to -- if that's going to be material to your Honor's decision,

we would ask for additional time in order to have someone advise us more specifically on that, but our understanding is exactly what I expressed, which is that was what Judge Cote found yesterday and that that is a firm basis.

THE COURT: What else do you have?

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, very briefly. Again, page 21 of the transcript in front of Judge Wang makes very clear that the question was not about non-citizens. There's no mention of non-citizens, lines 6 through 12.

THE COURT: Mr. Commissiong, I think, proffered that he had a separate conversation with pretrial services about non-citizens and came up with that number. That's his proffer.

MR. SOBELMAN: I have no reason to think that
Mr. Commissiong would mislead the Court. I would suspect that
the numbers for citizens versus non-citizens are different just
based on their incentives to flee, and the two percent that was
given by the pretrial services officer, when there was no
question about non-citizens, likely applied to everyone.

But regardless, I think the government's main point, which we've made, is that the court generally gets it right.

Just because there is a small number that flees, we don't want Mr. Limberatos to be part of that number. We don't ask to detain every defendant, in general, or in this case. There are even some non-citizens in this case that we agreed to bail for because their circumstances are just very different than

Mr. Limberatos'.

We've only asked for detention to your Honor for three of the 17 that were arrested. One, of course, consented to detention. We are being very careful here and not asking because if it's not something that we aren't genuinely deeply concerned about.

With respect to theft and fraud cases not leading to as many flights, we have no doubt that's true because generally narcotics offenses carry much higher penalties and mandatory penalties than theft or fraud cases. But here, unlike many fraud cases, including in which Judge Cote detained the defendant yesterday, there is a mandatory minimum sentence of two years that would run consecutive to any other sentence that would be imposed.

As we talked further in our letter, the guidelines range is very high. The government would calculate it in being in excess of ten years, and that's without factoring in the enormity of the evidence that was gathered from Mr. Limberatos' home.

THE COURT: So when you say in excess of ten years, you're referring to the 108 to 135 range?

MR. SOBELMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Plus two years.

MR. SOBELMAN: Plus two years. Most fraud offenses, in this district and elsewhere, carry a lower guidelines range

than that. Not all fraud offenses are equal, and this one is particularly serious.

In addition, and finally, Mr. Commissiong says, well, he owns a home. Well, your Honor, we filed a bill of particulars in this case and intend to forfeit his home because we have substantial evidence that it was purchased and funded with proceeds of crime. So if the defendant loses this case, whether by plea or trial, we intend to forfeit that home. He will not have that home, and we don't think that should be in the column in his favor in this bail proceeding.

With that, your Honor, I'll be happy to answer any additional questions your Honor may have.

THE COURT: Thank you. Well, the extradition issue is important, and so I want supplemental information on that.

Mr. Commissiong, if you are able to and wish to further parse your statistics on non-citizens, you can do that in a supplemental submission as well.

So what I propose is to hold this appeal under advisement to require that any supplemental submissions be made by Monday, and to continue the current bail conditions pending receipt of the supplemental submissions and a decision that I will make based on the papers.

MR. SOBELMAN: Your Honor, we'd be happy to do it on a tighter schedule, if your Honor wished, but we are fine with that schedule if your Honor wishes. I think we could probably

get back to you on the extradition issue within an hour. I just need to call the assistant that handled that case and have them cite me the provision.

Obviously, we would defer to the Court on timing. We genuinely are concerned that he is a flight risk and would prefer that, if your Honor is even considering detention, that the issue get resolved sooner rather than later.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Your Honor, Monday is fine.

THE COURT: Well, how much time do you need to tighten up your statistics? Based on his proffering, I'm going to require the government put its letter in by 9:00 tomorrow morning, and I'll give you until noon to respond, if you want.

MR. COMMISSIONG: I'd prefer -- if they're going to get a submission in by tomorrow, I'd prefer Monday.

THE COURT: Why? It's not a question of preference. It's a question of necessity that I'm asking.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Well, I have no idea what -- you know what, your Honor, if your Honor prefers, I'll get something in by tomorrow. Can I respond to them by the end of the day tomorrow?

THE COURT: Well, I would like to be in a position to make a decision tomorrow before the end of the day.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Okay.

THE COURT: And so 9:00 a.m. Noon. And you can certainly start preparing your position before you see this

letter.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Limberatos is under restrictions. Those restrictions continue in every particular until I make this determination. So do you understand that, Mr. Limberatos?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So I will assume

Mr. Limberatos' prompt availability, should I make a

determination that requires him to submit to detention.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Yes, your Honor.

Just one thing. You mentioned in the motion that I'm working with him to obtain the confession of judgment with respect to his property. Should I -- I guess the proper procedure would be to hold off until your Honor's determination tomorrow? Because he has to sign the affidavit, and then we have to get it docketed in the local courthouse in Suffolk County where the property is.

THE COURT: Well, I think you should have the paperwork all queued up to be able to comply promptly. There's no reason to stop preparing your paperwork.

MR. COMMISSIONG: Okay.

THE COURT: It makes sense not to file it before I make my decision, but I don't want you to say, okay, it will take me another three days to put the paperwork together and

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I'll file it next week if there's no need for that.
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               MR. COMMISSIONG: The paperwork is ready, and he just
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      has to sign, that's all.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. COMMISSIONG: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: So get that queued up, and if it doesn't
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     need to be filed, it won't be filed.
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               MR. COMMISSIONG: Okay.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you, all. Is there
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      anything else that we need to take up together?
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               MR. SOBELMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. COMMISSIONG: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. We are adjourned. Keep well.
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               (Adjourned)
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